Occupy Central
Occupy Central is a civil disobedience movement which began in Hong Kong on September 28, 2014. It calls on thousands of protesters to block roads and paralyse Hong Kong's financial district if the Beijing and Hong Kong governments do not agree to implement universal suffrage for the chief executive election in 2017 and the Legislative Council elections in 2020 according to "international standards." The movement was initiated by Benny Tai Yiu-ting (戴耀廷), an associate professor of law at the University of Hong Kong, in January 2013.
Umbrella Movement
The Umbrella Movement (Chinese: 雨傘運動; pinyin: yǔsǎn yùndòng) is a loose political movement that was created spontaneously during the Hong Kong protests of 2014. Its name derives from the recognition of the umbrella as a symbol of defiance and resistance against the Hong Kong government, and the united grass-roots objection to the decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC) of 31 August.
The movement consists of individuals numbering in the tens of thousands who participated in the protests that began on 28 September 2014, although Scholarism, the Hong Kong Federation of Students, Occupy Central with Love and Peace, groups are principally driving the demands for the rescission of the NPCSC decision.
The movement consists of individuals numbering in the tens of thousands who participated in the protests that began on 28 September 2014, although Scholarism, the Hong Kong Federation of Students, Occupy Central with Love and Peace, groups are principally driving the demands for the rescission of the NPCSC decision.
Occupy Central site in an area surrounding the Legislative Council and Central Government Offices at Tamar were cleared 22-06-2015.
Hong Kong reform vote
The Hong Kong government’s political reform proposal for how the city elects its leader by universal suffrage for the first time in 2017 is based on a strict framework set by Beijing. The plan limits the number of candidates to two or three and requires them to win majority support from a 1,200 strong nominating committee. Arguing that this does not constitute genuine universal suffrage, pan-democratic lawmakers have vowed to reject the package, while pro-democracy groups have protested. The government’s resolution was to be put to a vote by the 70-member Legislative Council in June 2015, requiring a two-thirds majority to be passed.
POST OCCUPY CENTRAL - DAY 233
POST REFORM VOTE：DAY 48 (05-08-2015)
POST REFORM VOTE：DAY 48 (05-08-2015)
Full coverage of the day’s events
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Hong Kong's accelerating political transformation may suggest a dim outlook, yet there remain a few glimmers of hope. Photo: HKEJ
How Hong Kong has changed and why I’m still optimistic
Hong Kong has changed a lot in the past three years, so much so that even scientists — who normally stay inside the ivory tower and their laboratories concentrating on experiments — feel that the conflicts between one country and two systems have become irreconcilable now that the “delicate equilibrium” has been lost, as noted by Yuen Kwok-yung, professor in infectious diseases at the University of Hong Kong.
Yuen, a hero in the fight against the SARS outbreak in 2003, resigned from HKU’s council last week.
The fact is that after 15 years of adaptation by Hongkongers to the new political order, aligned with other “endeavors” by the ruling class, Beijing concluded that Hong Kong’s genuine return to China can and should be fully effectuated.
With all this preparation, Leung Chun-ying’s taking office as chief executive in 2012 was a crucial push toward this ultimate goal.
Now the “new normal” is here, and it has several defining characteristics:
1. A governing team replaced by a team of “bruisers”
Apart from Leung himself, top ministers, Executive Council members and the chief government spokesman are virtually all belligerent figures either in personality or political stance, and their words or even body language can ignite bitter discord.
Chief Secretary Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor, known earlier for her bravura in handling tricky issues, has become a dove within the Leung administration, especially compared with the hawkish Arthur Li Kwok-cheung and Secretary for Justice Rimsky Yuen Kwok-keung.
2. The “second team of administrators” has taken to the stage
In 2008, Cao Erbao, chief of the comprehensive affairs working division of the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, noted explicitly in a paper that the office should act as Hong Kong’s “second team of administrators”, a prelude to mainland cadres’ stepped-up meddling in local governance.
In 2012, Cao lashed out at Gabriel Matthew Leung Cheuk-wai, then director of the chief executive’s office, for his tardy response in stopping a Legislative Council motion under the Powers and Privileges Ordinance to look into Leung Chun-ying’s suspected conflict of interest when he was sitting on a panel to select the master plan for the West Kowloon Cultural District.
The motion was subsequently withdrawn.
Now we know that without Cao and the liaison office, CY Leung wouldn’t have been able to get off so neatly.
For sure, he must requite his mainland bosses.
The office’s intervention can be seen on three levels: appointment and removal of principal officials and key public service officers, election of pro-establishment lawmakers and coordination of their voting, and community networking and district work for pro-government parties and groups.
3. Public sentiment means nothing to the authorities
Beijing and local officials were basically prudent in their words and behavior in the early days of the SAR, as the world was watching how China would honor its pledge of high autonomy for Hong Kong.
At that time, public opinion could somehow bind the government.
One example was in 2000, when the HKU council set up an independent inquiry panel to look into alleged government interference with the work of the university’s pollsters.
Andrew Lo Cheung-on, an aide to then chief executive Tung Chee-hwa, who was involved in the scandal, had to attend hearings when he was called.
If such an incident were to happen today, I wonder if the HKU council would dare set up an investigation, given the current political climate.
Even if it were to do so, the Leung administration would only sniff at a request to attend a hearing.
The government is now simply impervious to media, polls or protests and has become well-set in its obstinacy.
4. A tyrannical government conniving with violence from outside
Onerous systems and rules inherited from the colonial times — like those regulating broadcasting, public assembly, university governance and so on — are convenient vehicles to dismiss and grind down objections.
The government has also shown thinly disguised complicity with radical pro-government groups, like when anti-Occupy activists wearing blue ribbons harassed and attacked pro-democracy students.
Then comes the “tyranny of the system”, including violence by the police, arrests, politically motivated prosecutions and the like.
One shining example is a recent preposterous assault conviction against a female protester for attacking a police officer with her breasts.
So, what comes next?
I’d like to focus on two changes that are already underway: the emergence of ultra-moderates within the pan-democratic bloc, as well as the perceived increase in the number of senior voters.
Represented by Ronny Tong Ka-wah, who just quit his membership in the Civic Party, the ultra-moderates are being associated with the cracks within the pan-democratic camp, but I see their emergence as a normal development rather than a rebellion, as the camp needs to accommodate and incorporate views and approaches that span a wide spectrum.
Various assertions have been mushrooming since the end of the Occupy movement, after the old strategies led us down many empty roads.
Some theories can be rather aggressive, and a few democrats find it hard to endorse them.
But, had it not been for the advent of the new faction of ultra-moderates, I fear some of the moderate pan-democrats might have already defected to the pro-establishment side.
Can the increase in senior voters become a big impediment?
Media reports say 37,000 residents aged between 18 and 30 have registered as voters so far this year, while the corresponding figure in the age range of 50 or above is 120,000.
The common view is that while youngsters are more inclined to democracy, advancing years may be synonymous with increasing conservatism.
Yet from a more dynamic perspective, my conclusion is the opposite.
In a period of 10 years in which today’s fortysomething voters turn 50, if these people are advocates of democracy in the first place, I see no reason that they will change their stance simply because they are reach that chronological milestone.
Age does not necessarily determine political attitude.
Given time, we will see that voters aged 50 or above will become more liberal as more people enter the age group, and the trend will be further expedited by the natural passing away of older voters.
Time is on the side of democrats.
The judiciary's independence appears to be under growing threat from Beijing's political intervention. Photo: CNSA
Is politics eroding the independence of our courts?
Hong Kong has been proud of its tradition of an independent judiciary and the rule of law, two values that we believe differentiate our city from the mainland.
However, several recent rulings by local courts have raised fears that politics may be creeping into our judicial system and eroding its foundations.
This concern is reflected in the results of the latest survey by the University of Hong Kong’s Public Opinion Programme, which showed that people’s perception of the rule of law in the territory has fallen to a 10-year low.
The survey results came after deputy magistrate Michael Chan Pik-kiu of the Tuen Mun Magistrates’ Court ruled that a woman was guilty of assaulting a policeman with her breasts during a protest earlier this year. More than a hundred people wore bras in a rally to denounce the decision.
Hong Kong people still respect the judicial system and the rule of law as part of the city’s core values, basically because they believe that the courts remain insulated from politics.
Given the government’s use of its agencies and offices to implement the policies of Beijing, they look up to the courts to dispense justice without fear or favor.
However, as political tensions increase between the pro-Beijing camp and the pan-democrats, people are starting to feel that politicians are using the courts to impose their will on the public and provide legitimacy to their unjust policies and programs.
One of the clearest examples of this could be found in the Occupy protests last year.
As pro-democracy activities occupied the streets to demand genuine universal suffrage, pro-Beijing politicians filed for court injunctions to end their protests. They used the judicial system to resolve a political deadlock.
The question will be asked: Are the Hong Kong courts taking a political stance against the opposition camp for political reasons?
The answer, so far, is no. Many judges are professional enough to rule on cases without taking into consideration the political implications of their decisions, even though the cases may involve political issues.
For example, a judge ruled that 40 people who had been arrested in an Occupy zone were innocent, showing that the courts could defy the wishes of the powers that be and ignore the political repercussions of their rulings.
However, the government continues to use the court as a political tool to maintain social order by initiating the filing of criminal charges against activists like student leader Joshua Wong Chi-fung for a public demonstration that happened three years ago.
Was the case so complicated that the police needed three years to investigate? Of course not, but the government wanted to send the message to activists that they have to pay dearly for their anti-government actions.
While Hong Kong people still depend on the courts to uphold the law, they believe that the entire judicial system remains fragile in the face of Beijing’s political intervention.
Last year, the State Council released a white paper on the “one country, two systems” principle, asserting that Hong Kong’s autonomy comes from the authority of the central government.
The document also urges the Hong Kong judiciary staff to work closely with other civil service sectors, a clear indication that Beijing wants to strengthen its grip on the territory by extending its influence to the judiciary system.
Under the current system, Chief Executive Leung Chun-Ying exerts a powerful sway that could affect the independence of the judiciary. He has the power to appoint the chief justice, judges, the committee that selects the judges, as well as the justice secretary and the chief government prosecutor.
While the system has been running for decades since the British rule, people are afraid that CY Leung, given his firm loyalty to his Beijing masters, has no qualms in using his influence over the judiciary to advance his political agenda.
In addition, the current system of appointing deputy magistrates in the local magistracy is also raising concerns as they are working for the courts on a part-time basis and are allowed to have their own business outside the judiciary.
Such an arrangement could give rise to conflict of interests.
Retired High Court judge William Waung Sik-ying recently voiced his concern over the independence of the judiciary in Hong Kong, saying that Beijing’s increasing intervention in local affairs is eroding the city’s rule of law as the central government is trying its best to extend its influence to the judicial system.
Waung also said the appointment of members of the Judicial Officers Recommendation Commission who are too close to the administration could shake the judiciary’s independence as CY Leung has been labelled as a pro-Beijing politician.
His remarks touch on issues that fuel doubts on whether judicial independence still exists in Hong Kong.
Our judicial system is what distinguishes our city from other mainland cities. But it appears that the judiciary is having its own difficulties in upholding its independence in the face of political challenges from the administration.
When the courts fail to uphold justice and even draw public anger, it could be a signal that the judiciary is in trouble.
It’s worth seeing whether Beijing and Hong Kong authorities will uphold the independence of the courts, or seize the opportunity to bring the entire judiciary under their control.
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